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This study takes on an important part or regional growth, that is, the investment 
decisions of private firms. The question asked is: do corporations decide on investments 
in the same way in different parts of the territory? The paper analyses investments of 373 
large Brazilian firms in the period 1996-2004. The role of sales, cash-flow, external 
financing, and working capital is investigated through regression analysis, following the 
literature on firm investment decisions. Regional dummies used to capture differences in 
the role of those determinants indicate that there are significant differences across 
regions. This is important information for regional development policy, for different 





1.  Introduction 
 
 
In a perfect neoclassical world, factors would move to equalize returns, and 
therefore there would be no reason for regional income inequality. Observed differences 
would reflect variations in cost of living levels and migration costs. However, empirical 
studies have presented results that contradict that expected result. In the Brazilian case, 
for example, Azzoni and Servo (2002) and Menezes and Azzoni (2006) indicate that, 
even after controlling for demographic factors, education, job characteristics and cost of 
living levels, the income difference between the poorest and the richest metropolitan 
region is over 30%, well above what would be expected as migration costs. This residual 
income difference can be attributable to different factors. Azzoni et al. (2000), Gallup, 
Gaviria and Lora (2003) and Escobal and Torero (2005) stress the role of geography in 
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intensity of natural disasters, and human – settlement patterns, migration). Silveira-Neto 
and Azzoni (2005) concentrate on the sectoral composition of production in different 
regions and its effect on convergence. Other possible explanations are the different 
design, composition and operation of institutions, culture, social capital, etc.  
Within the realm of corporate finance, Colombo (2001) point out the limits to 
achieving of an optimal capital structure for Hungarian firms due to the remaining 
distortions of the planned system. Shen and Wang (2005) stress the fact that, contrary to 
the situation in the US, subsidiaries in Taiwan are allowed to buy stocks of the parent 
company, which brings consequences for the investment decisions of firms. Russo and 
Rossi (2001) indicate that small and medium Italian firms located within the Marshallian 
industrial districts have better access to external financing than similar firms in other 
contexts. This paper analyzes the investment decision-making process of private firms 
belonging to different parts of the territory as a possible source of regional inequality. 
Since a large part of total investment is performed by private companies, especially in 
LDCs, where government capacity to invest is usually limited, it is important to 
investigate whether or not there are differences in the factors affecting investment 
decisions. This is important information for regional policy, for if firms in different parts 
of the country rely on different factors, a national long term credit policy could not lead 
to optimal results. To the best of our knowledge, this aspect has not been analyzed in the 
literature. 
The paper is organized in five sections, including this introduction. Section 2 
considers the factors traditionally considered in the investment decision literature and 
argues in favor of a possible regional differentiation. Section 3 presents the data base and 
some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the model and its results. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the study. 
 
2.  Factors behind investment decisions of firms 
 
Although the analysis of investment decisions has been dealt with in the literature 
for long time, the subject received renewed interest with the work by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). Investment decisions are complex and not as frequent as other firm 
decisions, precluding the formation of rules-of-thumb. The literature stresses the role of 
information asymmetry in the credit market (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), for lending 
institutions have difficulties in differentiating among borrowers. Firm managers have 
more information on their business than bank officials, a factor that could lead to an 
under evaluation of the firm value, and hence on access to external capital. In this case, 
using internal sources of funds or debentures, commercial papers, etc. is a safer bet
3. The 
preference for internal funds would also depend on the tax regime and on transaction 
costs. The use of external funds depend, of course, on relative costs (the tax rate is an 
important issue here), but it also is expected to increase efficiency in managing funds. On 
the other hand, it increases the cost of bankruptcy. Other sources of conflict between 
stockholders, managers, and the lenders of capital, also influence the cost of debt. 
In order to test for those alternative explanations, different studies have introduced 
liquidity variables, recognizing the role of internal funds as determinant of investment. 
The representative firm typical of the theoretical model was abandoned, and micro data 
was used to take into account firm heterogeneity
4. In general, investment is regressed on 
cash-flow, indebtedness, profitability, and specific variables pertaining to different 
situations. The role of different factors is analyzed from the empirical results. Typically, a 
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The left-hand side variable is the investment rate in year t, for firm j (t = 1, … , T 
and  j = 1, …,  N); I is investment, and K is capital stock (fixed assets). On the right-hand 
side all the possible factors influencing the investment rate are expressed. CFjt  is cash 
flow;  Sjt is sales; Djt is corporate debt, and εjt is the error term. All variables are 
expressed as ratios to capital stock.  
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These studies assume the existence of a well-known investment function, in which the 
heterogeneity of firms may be considered by including a specific effect for each firm, as 
well as a time effect. Cash flow reflects the influence of possible liquidity restrictions, 
although it can also represent a potential for future profitability. Corporate debt is 
introduced to take into account the tax benefits of debt, as well as the notion that higher 
leverage may increase firm’s value
5. The use of lagged values seeks to consider the 
dynamic aspect of investment, as well as to avoid autocorrelation. The quadratic variable 
was introduced due to indications of non-linear behavior of residuals, as well as because 
it could reflect a quadratic form of cost adjustment. Sales bring in the role of the expected 
rate of change in the level of sales or production. 
In this paper we investigate whether or not the importance of these factors is the 
same for firms of different regions in Brazil. If we take the profit-maximizing 
representative firm, there is no reason why investment factors varied across regions. One 
possible situation occurs when firms are not the same in different locations. In that case, 
differences would be due to firm heterogeneity (ownership, sector, size, etc.). Chen 
(2006) concludes that family involvement in the management is an important factor to 
determine the firm’s choice of ownership regime. For firms selling only to the regional 
market, demand is different in distinct locations, as it is the industrial organization within 
which the firm operates. It is thus expected that firms within the same sector, with similar 
size and capital structure might rely on different factors, as compared with similar firms 
in a different competition environment. Almazan and Molina (2005) find that firms 
within more concentrated sectors exhibit greater intra-industry dispersion of leverage 
ratios. They find that dispersion is associated with use of incentive compensation, number 
of insiders in the boards, age, and capital expenditures in relation to assets. Mackay and 
Phillips (2005) conclude that financial structure depends on a firm’s position within its 
industry, and that financial leverage is higher and less dispersed in concentrated 
industries. 
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operating efficiency. If the surrounding institutional environment is different across regions, it would 
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Agarwal and Mohtadi (2004) analyze the financing choice of firms in developing 
countries, and conclude that equity market development favors firm’s equity financing 
over debt financing, while banking sector development favors debt financing over equity 
financing. The rules of the game might affect external capital cost, access to venture 
capital, stock market, availability of long term loans, etc. It can also change collateral 
requirements, tax treatment, etc. These points are investigated by Russo and Rossi (2001) 
in the Italian case, Shen and Wang (2005), in relation to American branches operating in 
Taiwan, and Colombo (2001), dealing with Hungarian firms, still under the influence of 
remaining planned economy rules.  
Finally, differences can be due to non-observable factors, such as culture, 
tradition, limitation of entrepreneurial skills, etc. Bitzenis (2004) indicates that 
geographical distance from advanced Western countries is an important barrier to foreign 
investment in Bulgaria, although factors related to delays in institutional reforms are also 
important. However, controlling for all other factors, the conclusion is that historical 
links do not affect a company’s decision to invest in another country. Trevino and Mixon 
(2004) argue, from a study of FDI in nine Latin American countries, that managers seek 
the minimal institutional distance between the home and the host country environments. 
Carr (2005) compares strategic decision styles of German, Japanese and Anglo-Saxon 
firms, and concludes that, even under globalization, Japanese firms generally, and 
German family firms in particular, exhibit deep-rooted differences from the Anglo-Saxon 
model, although evidence suggests convergence of the later. Harrison, Love and 
McMillan (2004) examine the role of foreign firms in crowding-out local firms out of the 
capital market in a group of countries, and find that FDI is associated with a reduction in 
financing constraints and with lower sensitivity of investment to cash flow for firms 
without foreign assets and for domestically owned enterprises. Interestingly for the point 
raised in this paper, they find that these effects are stronger for low-income than for high-
income regions.  Although the influence of such factors is almost impossible to quantify, one has to 
recognize that they might influence the way firms make investment decisions in different 
places. In this paper we try to disentangle part of this compound set of factors, 
highlighting the factors traditionally associated to investment decisions. 
 
 
3.  The database 
 
We analyze a sample of 373 of the 500 larger firms in Brazil, the equivalent to the 
Fortune 500 to the Brazilian context
6. We have eliminated all firms in the public utility 
sectors, as well as the ones belonging to public administrations (federal, state or local). 
We deal with balance statements of these companies, covering the period 1996-2004. 
Considering that we have 373 firms, making investment decisions over 9 years, we have 
3,357 investment decisions to work with.  
Table 1 presents general information on the companies. Of the 373 firms, 77% are 
in manufacturing and 23% in tertiary activities. In terms of the distribution across the five 
macro regions in Brazil, there is an approximate replication of the regional shares in 
GDP, with 60% coming from the richest Southeast region and 26% from the second 
richest South region. The poor Northeast region shows only 7%, the remaining 7% 
coming from the fast-growing resource-oriented regions of Center-West (agriculture, 
livestock) and North (mining, timber). Besides the resource-oriented activities, the North 
region hosts a tax-free import zone, with firms in electronics and motorcycles. It is clear 
from the table that the 7 firms in this region present higher investment rates and lower 
ratios of sales to capital stock, considering the high aggregate value of the products they 
sale. They also exhibit the lowest levels of indebtedness and profitability. Firms in the 
Southeast have the highest debt/capital stock ratio. It is clear that firms in the richer part 
of the country (Southeast and South) present higher levels of working capital. Finally, 
firms in the South are the ones with the highest ratio of debt/stockholder’s equity. 
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Table 1- Characteristics of Firms by Macro Regions – Average Values 
 
Regional Distribution 
Variables All  Firms
CO N NE S SE 
          
Investment/Capital Stock  .440  .460 .517 .360 .409  .459 
Cash Flow/ Capital Stock  .548  .808 .178 .370 .487  .588 
Sales/Capital Stock  8.04  6.51 12.616 3.81  8.614  8.258 
Debt/Capital Stock  1.037 .830 .895 .746 .775  1.204 
Change in Sales/Capital Stock  .325  .312 .269 .351 .307  .333 
Debt/Total Equity  .185  .176 .105 .189 .176  .192 
Net Income/Capital Stock  .371  .631 .049 .241 .333  .393 
Net Income/ Stockholders’ 
Equity  -.129 .162  .055  -.428  -.411  .0010 
Working Capital/Capital 
Stock  1.264 1.81 .816 .678  1.264  1.306 
Debt/Stockholders’ Equity  1.319 .358 .300 .943  2.879  .786 
          
Number of Firms  373 16 7 26 98  226 
 
 
4.  Models and results 
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where,  
Ikjt is the firm’s investment, defined as 1 − − t t K K ; t is the year, ranging from 1 to T;  j 
stands for firm, ranging from 1 to N;  Kjt is the capital stock (fixed assets); FCjt is cash 
flow;  ' Vjt are the sales variation; Vjt are the company’s sales;  VR are the sales of the 
firm in relation to the region; FINjt is the indebtedness of the company and εjt is the error 
term; K1, K2, K3 are the three regional dummies, which interact with cash-flos, sales, 
and indebtedness.  
The explanatory variables are typical of the literature on investment decisions, as 
explained in Section 2. Sales and Profitability are contemporaneous to investment, to 
capture the internal generation as a source of funds for investment. Cash-flow and 
Indebtedness are lagged one year, meaning that the investment decisions in year t is 
influenced by cash-flow generation in the previous year and on the degree of 
indebtedness the firm had at the beginning of the period. Time dummies are included to 
capture changes in economic conditions of different years. As for the regional aspects, we 
introduce a variable that relates the performance of the firm in relation to the regional 
economy it is located. We take the growth of sales of each firm and divide by the growth 
of sales for all firms in the same region. The idea is that investment decisions could 
depend on the regional environment the firms operates, in the sense that a booming 
region could present a positive influence on the investment decisions of all firms in the same neighborhood, regardless of sectors. Given that the investment decision is taken 
under uncertainty, a bandwagon effect is to be expected, in a sort of demonstration effect. 
To the best of our knowledge, this variable is totally absent in other studies on investment 
decisions. 
In order to check whether or not the factors behind investment decisions present 
different importance across regions, we introduce interaction dummies (slope dummies) 
between the three investment decision variables (sales, cash flow and indebtedness) and 
three macro regions in the country. If these dummies turn out significant, it means that 
the respective variable presents different coefficients across regions, that is, its influence 
differs depending on the region the firm is located. Given the small number of firms in 
regions North, Center-West and Northeast, we have considered these three regions as 
one, representing the poorer part of the country. Therefore, we deal with three regions: 
poor (49 firms), South (98 firms) and Southeast (226 firms). The poor region is taken as a 
reference for the definition of the dummies, meaning that the coefficients of the other 
regions interaction dummies will be defined in relation to that region. We estimate the 
model for all firms together and individually for commerce and service firms and 
manufacturing firms. 
Panel data models with fixed or random effects have been used to estimate 
parameters when a non-observed variable, αj, was added to a model to consider the 
effects of variables that are specific to each firm and constant over time. The firm-
specific effect can absorb the peculiar behavior, such as management capacity. The time 
component, ωt, aims to incorporate the effect of all of the observed and non-observed 
variables that do not vary between firms, but that vary between years. 
The choice between fixed or random effect models is not an easy one. While the model 
with a stochastic component allows for inferences regarding the population as a whole, in 
the fixed effect model the inference is restricted to the companies in the sample. When a 
random effects model is used, it is assumed that the firm-specific effect and the 
regressors are non-correlated. Despite the interest in drawing inferences for the entire 
population, for which the random effect model is more appropriate, the fixed effect 
estimator may be preferred. If there is correlation between the firm-specific effect and the 
explanatory variables, the estimation by random effects will lead to inconsistent estimators, even ifN →∞. It is probable that firm-specific characteristics, such as 
managerial capability, will affect the management of own capital, and also financial 
leverage choices, thus affecting investment decisions. Thus, the fixed effect model would 
be more appropriate for our study. Although this choice seems to be the most appropriate 
from an economic point of view, a test rejected the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between the models (Wooldridge, 2002).  
Despite the significance of the parameters of the fixed effect model, the 
criticism remains that the parameters may be biased or even inconsistent, due to 
endogeneity, since the error term could be correlated with the lagged dependent variable. 
This correlation arises as from the transformation of the model to eliminate the firm-
specific and time effects, as well as because of the short period considered, even 
though N →∞
7. An alternative way of correcting for the possible problem of inconsistent 
parameters is to use an instrumental variable for the endogenous explanatory variable. 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) proposed the use of the second lag of the dependent variable, 
yt-2 or (yt-2- yt-3) as instruments for yt-1; Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a procedure in 
which the first difference is obtained and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
applied, using lags in levels as instruments for the dependent and independent variables.  
In estimating model the endogenous variable with two lags was used as an 
instrument for the endogenous variable, and lagged values as instruments for the 
independent variables. The use of yt-2 seems more appropriate since it avoids the loss of 
more than one time period. The GMM estimation used the method proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) that have the main criticism related to the existence of a weak 
correlation between the first differences of the variables and their lagged levels, as well 
as the fact that it compromises the economic meaning of the transformed variable. The 
use of larger lags in the Arellano and Bond’s estimator could raise suspicions regarding 
the validity of both the instruments and the results. Since the Sargan test rejects the 
validity of the instruments in the GMM estimation, we chose the Instrumental Variable 
model (IV).  
                                                 
7 While the time dimension (T) is not so short, it is probable that the estimated parameters are biased. 
Hsiao, Pesaran and Tahmiscioglu (2002) and Kiviet (1995) present results for simulations for T=3 and T=6, 
when N→ ∞. Since the companies are heterogeneous in terms of their characteristics, the 
suspicion remains that heteroskedasticity is present, implying that the standard error and 
hypothesis tests are invalid. Applying the Cook-Weisberg test, we confirmed the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. In order to reduce this problem, we have grouped firms by 
sector and by region. The Durbin test for autocorrelation in the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable indicated no sign of autocorrelation.  
The results are presented in tables 2 and 3. In Table 2 we present the results 
involving the variables traditionally used in investment decision studies. The estimated 
coefficients replicate those of other studies in the same field in Brazil, as in Kalatziz et all 
(2006a and 2006b), for the period 1987-1996. Sales, Cash Flow and Indebtedness present 
positive and significant coefficients in all cases. Firms more capital intensive present 
higher investment, controlling for the other variables in the model, and this does not 
change across the three versions of the model, and for all types of firms.  
In the first column of each group we run the model with the traditional variables 
only; the second version includes the regional environment in which the firm operates; 
the third version includes the regional interaction dummies. In the case of firms in the 
manufacturing sector, the inclusion of these variables changes the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients of the traditional variables, but does not change the sign and 
statistical significance. In the case of firms in commerce and services, Indebtedness turns 
out to be non-significant, and Cash Flow even changes sign with the inclusion of the 
interaction dummies. In general, the model performs better for manufacturing firms, with 
more significant variables, although the differences are impressive. For example, the R
2 
is higher for manufacturing regressions, especially so when all variables are included. 
As for the variables with regional interest, the growth of the firm in relation to 
other firms in the region is significant for manufacturing firms, but not so for firms in 
commerce and services. Thus, for manufacturing firms investment is more intense in for 
firms growing faster than their regions. The results for the interaction dummies are 
presented in Table 3. It shows that Sales is less important for firms in the richer South 
and Southeast regions than for the average and, for that matter, than for firms in the poor 
region of the country. The difference is more important for manufacturing firms: the 
coefficient for all firms is 0.16, and for firms in the South and Southeast, it becomes 0.04. In the case of Commerce and Services, the general coefficient is 0.05, but it is only 0.025 
for firms in the South. For all firms grouped, the general coefficient is 0.7, and for firms 
in the South and Southeast it is 0.03 and 0.04, respectively. There are no significant 
differences across regions in the importance of Cash Flow. Finally, there are differences 
in the importance of indebtedness across regions, especially in the manufacturing sector. 
For all firms as a group, the general coefficient is 0.2, but it becomes 0.06 for firms in the 
South and 0.09 for firms in the Southeast. In the case of manufacturing firms, the general 
coefficient is 0.18, but it becomes only 0.01 for firms in the South. 
One key aspect discussed in the specific investment decision literature is whether 
or not firms are financially restricted. A firm is considered to be financially restricted if 
the cost or availability of external financing prevents it from realizing new projects that it 
would have selected if internal financing had been available (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). 
For Bond and Reenen (2002), a firm is financial restricted if an unexpected increase in 
the availability of internal funds causes an increase in investment spending, not related to 
potential future profitability. Considering the importance of Sales for investment 
decisions of firms, it is clear that firms in the richer regions of the country are less 
financially restricted than firms in the poor region of the country. In previous studies in 
Brazil, it was confirmed that capital intensive firms are less financially restricted than 
firms with lower capital intensity (Kalatzis et al. 2006a and 2006b). Since we are 
controlling for capital intensity in these regressions, this factor is controlled for, that is, it 
can not be said that firms in the poor region are less capital intensive. In terms of 
indebtedness (defined as the debt/equity ratio in the previous year), the results indicate 
that firms in the richer South and Southeast region rely less on 
 Table 2 – Investment variables results 
 
  All Firms  Commerce and Services  Manufacturing 
0.2580*** 0.158** 0.149** -0.0885  -0.1124  -0.129 0.374*** 0.259*** 0.156*  Constant  (0.069)  (0.0697) (0.071)  (0.14)  (0.142) (0.149) (0.078) (0.079) (0.082) 
-0.1048** -0.15*** -0.144  -0.1394 -0.153* -0.1538  -0.0876  -0.145** -0.13**  Investment -1  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.088)  (0.089) (0.099) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
-0.0141* -0.0112 -0.0122 -0.0189  -0.018*** -0.0162  -0.0164 -0.013  -0.015  (Investment -1)
2  (0.008)  (0.0079) (0.008) (0.0129) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
0.0456*** 0.0399*** 0.069*** 0.0399*** 0.038*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.163*  Sales  (0.0033) (0.0034)  (0.0098) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.0097) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.026) 
0.067*** 0.080***  0.0794  0.174*** 0.171*** -0.1201 0.055*** 0.071*** 0.096*** Cash Flow  (0.0186) (0.0198) (0.055) (0.0569) (0.057)  (0.39) (0.0199) (0.0197) (0.057) 
0.092*** 0.096***  0.197*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 0.1570 0.073*** 0.079*** 0.177*** Indebtedness  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.055) (0.0256) (0.026) (0.164) (0.017) (0.017) (0.059) 
1.192*** 1.261***  1.263*** 0.729*** 0.733*** 0.73***  1.285*** 1.369*** 1.39***  Capital Intensity  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.134)  (0.134) (0.134) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) 
- 0.105***  0.107*** -  0.0525  0.0552 -  0.11***  0.109*** Growth in relation to region  - (0.0149)  (0.015) - (0.045)  (0.045)  -  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Time  dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional interaction dummies No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
R
2  0.4798  0.4933 0.4980 0.4473 0.4492 0.4582  0.5052  0.5210  0.5302 
N. of Observations  2238  2238  2238  510  510  510  1728  1728  1728 
  
 
Table 3 – Regional differences 
 
    All Firms  Commerce 
and Services Manufacturing 
-0.04*** -0.027**  -0.12***  South 
(0.0114) (0.012)  (0.028) 
-0.03*** -0.0106  -0.12*** 
Sales  
Southeast (0.011) (0.013)  (0.026) 
0.0067 0.4482  -0.037  South 
(0.070) (0.432)  (0.073) 
-0.0038 0.2769  -0.031 
Cash Flow 
Southeast (0.0595) (0.393)  (0.061) 
-0.14** 0.0679 -0.164**  South 
(0.072) (0.204)  (0.078) 
-0.102* -0.0190  -0.098 
Indebtedness 




Thus, the above conclusion might indicate difficulties in accessing capital 
sources in the poor area of the country, making firms in that region to rely more heavily 
in internal sources of funds. This conclusion sort of corroborates the results of Agarwal 
and Mohtadi (2004) and Harrison et all. (2004). However, firms in the rich South region 
tend to present lower importance for loans, as the regional differences in the coefficients 
of Indebtedness indicate. Thus, as a general conclusion, it can not be said that there are 




5.  Conclusions 
 
 
This paper analyzes the investment decision-making process of private firms 
belonging to different parts of the territory as a possible source of regional inequality. 
We present a discussion of the factors traditionally considered in the investment 
decision literature and introduce some arguments to explain a possible regional 
differentiation in the importance of those investment factors. Based on a sample of 373 
large Brazilian firms, we estimate a panel model introducing two types of regional 
variables: the growth of the firm in relation to the regional economy, and interaction 
dummies between the investment variables and the regions.  The results indicate that for manufacturing firms investment is more intense for 
firms growing faster than their regions. Considering the importance of Sales for 
investment decisions of firms, it is clear that firms in the richer regions of the country 
are less financially restricted than firms in the poor region of the country, since they rely 
more intensively on internal sources of fund generation, what might indicate difficulties 
in accessing capital sources in the poor area of the country. These preliminary findings 
suggest that the analysis of the regional differences in the importance of investment 
factors is an issue worth pursuing. This is important information for regional policy, 
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